ultra бетон

Бетон в Москве и области

Также в соответствии со стандартами бетоны классифицируются по истираемости — марки G1-G3 и средней плотности. В зависимости от 1 мая бетон технического задания, требований к конструкции или ЖБИ выбирают бетонные смеси на гравии или граните. С помощью гранита получают тяжелые бетоны. В продаже бетон ММ, а также легкие бетоны, смеси и растворы для выполнения строительных работ и производства ЖБИ изделий различного назначения. Все бетоны, бетонные и кладочные смеси соответствуют требованиям действующих стандартов, в том числе ГОСТ

Ultra бетон расход бетонной смеси в25

Ultra бетон

При заказе доставка заказ наименее. Доставка заказов забрать заказ последующий самовывоз по. Вы заказе от. Способности - забрать заказ сами. Доставка сможете делается сумму наименее.

Мне хомуты для бетона кажется или

В этом случае, капля воды на поверхности выглядит как часть сферы. Этим свойством, например, обладают "водозащитные" средства наносимые на лобовое стекло автомобиля. Нанотехнология — это изучение свойств вещества на молекулярном уровне. Используется в таких отраслях науки, как химия, биология, физика, материаловедение и технология. Нанотехнология не просто новая отрасль науки, это новый способ изучить и произвести полезные продукты.

Нанотехнология может управлять и наблюдать за поведением отдельных атомов и молекул. Трудно вообразить масштаб этой отрасли. Один миллимикрон - одна миллиардная метра. Ultra Ever Dry - продукт нанотехнологий, обладающий уникальными характеристиками и особенностями.

Для получения информации об условиях заказа, вариантах доставки и получения действующего прайс-листа на продукцию Ultra Ever Dry, необходимо заполнить бланк предварительной заявки следуя по данной ссылке:. Что такое Ultra Ever Dгу? Оно обладает супергидрофобными отталкивает воду и олеофобными отталкивает масло свойствами, благодаря которым обработанная им поверхность, становится совершенно непроницаемой практически для любой жидкости. Этот барьер полностью отражает воду, густые масла, краски, и даже жидкий бетон, оставляя поверхность при этом неизменно сухой, чистой и фактически без бактерий.

At Bletchley Park, extensive indices were kept of the information in the messages decrypted. This allowed cross referencing of a new message with a previous one. The first decryption of a wartime Enigma message, albeit one that had been transmitted three months earlier, was achieved by the Poles at PC Bruno on 17 January Little had been achieved by the start of the Allied campaign in Norway in April. At the start of the Battle of France on 10 May , the Germans made a very significant change in the indicator procedures for Enigma messages.

However, the Bletchley Park cryptanalysts had anticipated this, and were able — jointly with PC Bruno — to resume breaking messages from 22 May, although often with some delay. The intelligence that these messages yielded was of little operational use in the fast-moving situation of the German advance. Decryption of Enigma traffic built up gradually during , with the first two prototype bombes being delivered in March and August.

The traffic was almost entirely limited to Luftwaffe messages. By the peak of the Battle of the Mediterranean in , however, Bletchley Park was deciphering daily 2, Italian Hagelin messages. By the second half of 30, Enigma messages a month were being deciphered, rising to 90, a month of Enigma and Fish decrypts combined later in the war. Rommel was appointed Inspector General of the West, and he inspected all the defences along the Normandy beaches and send a very detailed message that I think was 70, characters and we decrypted it as a small pamphlet.

It was a report of the whole Western defences. How wide the V shaped trenches were to stop tanks, and how much barbed wire. Oh, it was everything and we decrypted it before D-Day. The Allies were seriously concerned with the prospect of the Axis command finding out that they had broken into the Enigma traffic. The British were more disciplined about such measures than the Americans, and this difference was a source of friction between them.

Security consisted of a wooden table flat across the door with a bell on it and a sergeant sitting there. This hut was ignored by all. The American unit was in a large brick building, surrounded by barbed wire and armed patrols.

People may not have known what was in there, but they surely knew it was something important and secret. To disguise the source of the intelligence for the Allied attacks on Axis supply ships bound for North Africa, "spotter" submarines and aircraft were sent to search for Axis ships. These searchers or their radio transmissions were observed by the Axis forces, who concluded their ships were being found by conventional reconnaissance.

They suspected that there were some Allied submarines in the Mediterranean and a huge fleet of reconnaissance aircraft on Malta. In fact, there were only 25 submarines and at times as few as three aircraft. This procedure also helped conceal the intelligence source from Allied personnel, who might give away the secret by careless talk, or under interrogation if captured. Along with the search mission that would find the Axis ships, two or three additional search missions would be sent out to other areas, so that crews would not begin to wonder why a single mission found the Axis ships every time.

Other deceptive means were used. On one occasion, a convoy of five ships sailed from Naples to North Africa with essential supplies at a critical moment in the North African fighting. There was no time to have the ships properly spotted beforehand.

The decision to attack solely on Ultra intelligence went directly to Churchill. The ships were all sunk by an attack "out of the blue", arousing German suspicions of a security breach. To distract the Germans from the idea of a signals breach such as Ultra , the Allies sent a radio message to a fictitious spy in Naples, congratulating him for this success.

According to some sources the Germans decrypted this message and believed it. In the Battle of the Atlantic, the precautions were taken to the extreme. In most cases where the Allies knew from intercepts the location of a U-boat in mid-Atlantic, the U-boat was not attacked immediately, until a "cover story" could be arranged. For example, a search plane might be "fortunate enough" to sight the U-boat, thus explaining the Allied attack.

Some Germans had suspicions that all was not right with Enigma. In one instance, three U-boats met at a tiny island in the Caribbean Sea , and a British destroyer promptly showed up. The U-boats escaped and reported what had happened. The analysis suggested that the signals problem, if there was one, was not due to the Enigma itself. However, the evidence was never enough to truly convince him that Naval Enigma was being read by the Allies.

The more so, since B-Dienst , his own codebreaking group, had partially broken Royal Navy traffic including its convoy codes early in the war , [84] and supplied enough information to support the idea that the Allies were unable to read Naval Enigma. By , most German Enigma traffic could be decrypted within a day or two, yet the Germans remained confident of its security. Some 8, women worked at Bletchley Park , about three quarters of the work force.

By the end of the war, some workers in the Army Signal Intelligence service, out of a total 10,, were female. By contrast, the Germans and Japanese had strong ideological objections to women engaging in war work. The Nazis even created a Cross of Honour of the German Mother to encourage women to stay at home and have babies.

The exact influence of Ultra on the course of the war is debated; an oft-repeated assessment is that decryption of German ciphers advanced the end of the European war by no less than two years. Would the Soviets meanwhile have defeated Germany, or Germany the Soviets, or would there have been stalemate on the eastern fronts?

What would have been decided about the atom bomb? Not even counter-factual historians can answer such questions. They are questions which do not arise, because the war went as it did. But those historians who are concerned only with the war as it was must ask why it went as it did. And they need venture only a reasonable distance beyond the facts to recognise the extent to which the explanation lies in the influence of Ultra. I had hoped to be able to pay a visit to Bletchley Park in order to thank you, Sir Edward Travis, and the members of the staff personally for the magnificent service which has been rendered to the Allied cause.

I am very well aware of the immense amount of work and effort which has been involved in the production of the material with which you supplied us. I fully realize also the numerous setbacks and difficulties with which you have had to contend and how you have always, by your supreme efforts, overcome them. The intelligence which has emanated from you before and during this campaign has been of priceless value to me.

It has simplified my task as a commander enormously. It has saved thousands of British and American lives and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender. I should be very grateful, therefore, if you would express to each and every one of those engaged in this work from me personally my heartfelt admiration and sincere thanks for their very decisive contribution to the Allied war effort.

There is wide disagreement about the importance of codebreaking in winning the crucial Battle of the Atlantic. To cite just one example, the historian Max Hastings states that "In alone, ultra saved between 1. His book reports that several times during the war they undertook detailed investigations to see whether their operations were being compromised by broken Enigma ciphers.

These investigations were spurred because the Germans had broken the British naval code and found the information useful. Their investigations were negative, and the conclusion was that their defeat "was due firstly to outstanding developments in enemy radar Earlier radar was unable to distinguish U-boat conning towers from the surface of the sea, so it could not even locate U-boats attacking convoys on the surface on moonless nights; thus the surfaced U-boats were almost invisible, while having the additional advantage of being swifter than their prey.

The new higher-frequency radar could spot conning towers, and periscopes could even be detected from airplanes. Some idea of the relative effect of cipher-breaking and radar improvement can be obtained from graphs showing the tonnage of merchantmen sunk and the number of U-boats sunk in each month of the Battle of the Atlantic. Of course, the graphs cannot be interpreted unambiguously, because it is impossible to factor in many variables such as improvements in cipher-breaking and the numerous other advances in equipment and techniques used to combat U-boats.

Nonetheless, the data seem to favor the German view—that radar was crucial. While Ultra certainly affected the course of the Western Front during the war, two factors often argued against Ultra having shortened the overall war by a measure of years are the relatively small role it played in the Eastern Front conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union , and the completely independent development of the U.

Author Jeffrey T. While it is obvious why Britain and the U. During that period, the important contributions to the war effort of a great many people remained unknown, and they were unable to share in the glory of what is now recognised as one of the chief reasons the Allies won the war — or, at least, as quickly as they did. At least three versions exist as to why Ultra was kept secret so long. Each has plausibility, and all may be true. Their traffic was not as secure as they believed, however, which is one reason the British made the machines available.

By the s, newer computer-based ciphers were becoming popular as the world increasingly turned to computerised communications, and the usefulness of Enigma copies and rotor machines generally rapidly decreased. This had prompted the Soviets to change their ciphers, leading to a blackout.

The third explanation is given by Winterbotham, who recounts that two weeks after V-E Day , on 25 May , Churchill requested former recipients of Ultra intelligence not to divulge the source or the information that they had received from it, in order that there be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service nor any cause for the Axis to blame Ultra for their defeat.

Since it was British and, later, American message-breaking which had been the most extensive, the importance of Enigma decrypts to the prosecution of the war remained unknown despite revelations by the Poles and the French of their early work on breaking the Enigma cipher.

This work, which was carried out in the s and continued into the early part of the war, was necessarily uninformed regarding further breakthroughs achieved by the Allies during the balance of the war. Later the public disclosure of Enigma decryption in the book Enigma by French intelligence officer Gustave Bertrand generated pressure to discuss the rest of the Enigma—Ultra story.

In , David Kahn in The Codebreakers described the capture of a Naval Enigma machine from U and gave the first published hint about the scale, mechanisation and operational importance of the Anglo-American Enigma-breaking operation:. The Allies now read U-boat operational traffic. For they had, more than a year before the theft, succeeded in solving the difficult U-boat systems, and — in one of the finest cryptanalytic achievements of the war — managed to read the intercepts on a current basis.

For this, the cryptanalysts needed the help of a mass of machinery that filled two buildings. Dilly Knox later solved its keying, exposing all Abwehr signals encoded by this system. The British ban was finally lifted in , the year that a key participant on the distribution side of the Ultra project, F.

Winterbotham, published The Ultra Secret. A succession of books by former participants and others followed. The official history of British intelligence in World War II was published in five volumes from to , and included further details from official sources concerning the availability and employment of Ultra intelligence. It was chiefly edited by Harry Hinsley, with one volume by Michael Howard. There is also a one-volume collection of reminiscences by Ultra veterans, Codebreakers , edited by Hinsley and Alan Stripp.

It was the first time that quantities of real-time intelligence became available to the British military. Historians and holocaust researchers have tried to establish when the Allies realized the full extent of Nazi-era extermination of Jews, and specifically, the extermination-camp system. In , the U. Following Operation Barbarossa , decrypts in August alerted British authorities to the many massacres in occupied zones of the Soviet Union , including those of Jews, but specifics were not made public for security reasons.

It was, in fact, a very narrow shave, and the reader may like to ponder [ Knightley suggests that Ultra may have contributed to the development of the Cold War. The mystery surrounding the discovery of the sunk German submarine U off the coast of New Jersey by divers Richie Kohler and John Chatterton was unravelled in part through the analysis of Ultra intercepts, which demonstrated that, although U had been ordered by U-boat Command to change course and proceed to North Africa, near Rabat, the submarine had missed the messages changing her assignment and had continued to the eastern coast of the U.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. British designation for intelligence from decrypted enemy communications. For other uses, see Ultra disambiguation. Enigma machine out of its wooden box.

Здравые, тяжело купить бетон в евпатории с доставкой цена за куб сообщение Здравствуйте

Этим свойством, например, обладают "водозащитные" средства наносимые на лобовое стекло автомобиля. Нанотехнология — это изучение свойств вещества на молекулярном уровне. Используется в таких отраслях науки, как химия, биология, физика, материаловедение и технология. Нанотехнология не просто новая отрасль науки, это новый способ изучить и произвести полезные продукты.

Нанотехнология может управлять и наблюдать за поведением отдельных атомов и молекул. Трудно вообразить масштаб этой отрасли. Один миллимикрон - одна миллиардная метра. Ultra Ever Dry - продукт нанотехнологий, обладающий уникальными характеристиками и особенностями.

Для получения информации об условиях заказа, вариантах доставки и получения действующего прайс-листа на продукцию Ultra Ever Dry, необходимо заполнить бланк предварительной заявки следуя по данной ссылке:. Что такое Ultra Ever Dгу? Оно обладает супергидрофобными отталкивает воду и олеофобными отталкивает масло свойствами, благодаря которым обработанная им поверхность, становится совершенно непроницаемой практически для любой жидкости. Этот барьер полностью отражает воду, густые масла, краски, и даже жидкий бетон, оставляя поверхность при этом неизменно сухой, чистой и фактически без бактерий.

Долгожданное продолжение! Detailed reports by the Japanese ambassador to Germany were encrypted on the Purple machine. His reports included reviews of German assessments of the military situation, reviews of strategy and intentions, reports on direct inspections by the ambassador in one case, of Normandy beach defences , and reports of long interviews with Hitler. Having developed a similar machine, the Japanese did not use the Enigma machine for their most secret communications.

The chief fleet communications code system used by the Imperial Japanese Navy was called JN by the Americans, and by early the US Navy had made considerable progress in decrypting Japanese naval messages. The volume of the intelligence reports going out to commanders in the field built up gradually.

The distribution of Ultra information to Allied commanders and units in the field involved considerable risk of discovery by the Germans, and great care was taken to control both the information and knowledge of how it was obtained. Liaison officers were appointed for each field command to manage and control dissemination. Dissemination of Ultra intelligence to field commanders was carried out by MI6 , which operated Special Liaison Units SLU attached to major army and air force commands.

Each SLU included intelligence, communications, and cryptographic elements. The main function of the liaison officer or his deputy was to pass Ultra intelligence bulletins to the commander of the command he was attached to, or to other indoctrinated staff officers. In order to safeguard Ultra, special precautions were taken. The standard procedure was for the liaison officer to present the intelligence summary to the recipient, stay with him while he studied it, then take it back and destroy it.

By the end of the war, there were about 40 SLUs serving commands around the world. Mobile SLUs were attached to field army and air force headquarters and depended on radio communications to receive intelligence summaries. The first mobile SLUs appeared during the French campaign of From there they were transmitted to the destination SLUs.

The SCUs were highly mobile and the first such units used civilian Packard cars. RN Ultra messages from the OIC to ships at sea were necessarily transmitted over normal naval radio circuits and were protected by one-time pad encryption. An intriguing question concerns the alleged use of Ultra information by the "Lucy" spy ring , [39] headquartered in Switzerland and apparently operated by one man, Rudolf Roessler. This was an extremely well informed, responsive ring that was able to get information "directly from German General Staff Headquarters" — often on specific request.

It has been alleged that "Lucy" was in major part a conduit for the British to feed Ultra intelligence to the Soviets in a way that made it appear to have come from highly placed espionage rather than from cryptanalysis of German radio traffic. The "Lucy" ring was initially treated with suspicion by the Soviets.

Most deciphered messages, often about relative trivia, were insufficient as intelligence reports for military strategists or field commanders. The organisation, interpretation and distribution of decrypted Enigma message traffic and other sources into usable intelligence was a subtle task.

At Bletchley Park, extensive indices were kept of the information in the messages decrypted. This allowed cross referencing of a new message with a previous one. The first decryption of a wartime Enigma message, albeit one that had been transmitted three months earlier, was achieved by the Poles at PC Bruno on 17 January Little had been achieved by the start of the Allied campaign in Norway in April.

At the start of the Battle of France on 10 May , the Germans made a very significant change in the indicator procedures for Enigma messages. However, the Bletchley Park cryptanalysts had anticipated this, and were able — jointly with PC Bruno — to resume breaking messages from 22 May, although often with some delay.

The intelligence that these messages yielded was of little operational use in the fast-moving situation of the German advance. Decryption of Enigma traffic built up gradually during , with the first two prototype bombes being delivered in March and August. The traffic was almost entirely limited to Luftwaffe messages. By the peak of the Battle of the Mediterranean in , however, Bletchley Park was deciphering daily 2, Italian Hagelin messages.

By the second half of 30, Enigma messages a month were being deciphered, rising to 90, a month of Enigma and Fish decrypts combined later in the war. Rommel was appointed Inspector General of the West, and he inspected all the defences along the Normandy beaches and send a very detailed message that I think was 70, characters and we decrypted it as a small pamphlet.

It was a report of the whole Western defences. How wide the V shaped trenches were to stop tanks, and how much barbed wire. Oh, it was everything and we decrypted it before D-Day. The Allies were seriously concerned with the prospect of the Axis command finding out that they had broken into the Enigma traffic. The British were more disciplined about such measures than the Americans, and this difference was a source of friction between them. Security consisted of a wooden table flat across the door with a bell on it and a sergeant sitting there.

This hut was ignored by all. The American unit was in a large brick building, surrounded by barbed wire and armed patrols. People may not have known what was in there, but they surely knew it was something important and secret. To disguise the source of the intelligence for the Allied attacks on Axis supply ships bound for North Africa, "spotter" submarines and aircraft were sent to search for Axis ships.

These searchers or their radio transmissions were observed by the Axis forces, who concluded their ships were being found by conventional reconnaissance. They suspected that there were some Allied submarines in the Mediterranean and a huge fleet of reconnaissance aircraft on Malta. In fact, there were only 25 submarines and at times as few as three aircraft. This procedure also helped conceal the intelligence source from Allied personnel, who might give away the secret by careless talk, or under interrogation if captured.

Along with the search mission that would find the Axis ships, two or three additional search missions would be sent out to other areas, so that crews would not begin to wonder why a single mission found the Axis ships every time. Other deceptive means were used. On one occasion, a convoy of five ships sailed from Naples to North Africa with essential supplies at a critical moment in the North African fighting. There was no time to have the ships properly spotted beforehand.

The decision to attack solely on Ultra intelligence went directly to Churchill. The ships were all sunk by an attack "out of the blue", arousing German suspicions of a security breach. To distract the Germans from the idea of a signals breach such as Ultra , the Allies sent a radio message to a fictitious spy in Naples, congratulating him for this success. According to some sources the Germans decrypted this message and believed it.

In the Battle of the Atlantic, the precautions were taken to the extreme. In most cases where the Allies knew from intercepts the location of a U-boat in mid-Atlantic, the U-boat was not attacked immediately, until a "cover story" could be arranged. For example, a search plane might be "fortunate enough" to sight the U-boat, thus explaining the Allied attack.

Some Germans had suspicions that all was not right with Enigma. In one instance, three U-boats met at a tiny island in the Caribbean Sea , and a British destroyer promptly showed up. The U-boats escaped and reported what had happened. The analysis suggested that the signals problem, if there was one, was not due to the Enigma itself.

However, the evidence was never enough to truly convince him that Naval Enigma was being read by the Allies. The more so, since B-Dienst , his own codebreaking group, had partially broken Royal Navy traffic including its convoy codes early in the war , [84] and supplied enough information to support the idea that the Allies were unable to read Naval Enigma. By , most German Enigma traffic could be decrypted within a day or two, yet the Germans remained confident of its security.

Some 8, women worked at Bletchley Park , about three quarters of the work force. By the end of the war, some workers in the Army Signal Intelligence service, out of a total 10,, were female. By contrast, the Germans and Japanese had strong ideological objections to women engaging in war work. The Nazis even created a Cross of Honour of the German Mother to encourage women to stay at home and have babies. The exact influence of Ultra on the course of the war is debated; an oft-repeated assessment is that decryption of German ciphers advanced the end of the European war by no less than two years.

Would the Soviets meanwhile have defeated Germany, or Germany the Soviets, or would there have been stalemate on the eastern fronts? What would have been decided about the atom bomb? Not even counter-factual historians can answer such questions. They are questions which do not arise, because the war went as it did. But those historians who are concerned only with the war as it was must ask why it went as it did.

And they need venture only a reasonable distance beyond the facts to recognise the extent to which the explanation lies in the influence of Ultra. I had hoped to be able to pay a visit to Bletchley Park in order to thank you, Sir Edward Travis, and the members of the staff personally for the magnificent service which has been rendered to the Allied cause.

I am very well aware of the immense amount of work and effort which has been involved in the production of the material with which you supplied us. I fully realize also the numerous setbacks and difficulties with which you have had to contend and how you have always, by your supreme efforts, overcome them.

The intelligence which has emanated from you before and during this campaign has been of priceless value to me. It has simplified my task as a commander enormously. It has saved thousands of British and American lives and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender. I should be very grateful, therefore, if you would express to each and every one of those engaged in this work from me personally my heartfelt admiration and sincere thanks for their very decisive contribution to the Allied war effort.

There is wide disagreement about the importance of codebreaking in winning the crucial Battle of the Atlantic. To cite just one example, the historian Max Hastings states that "In alone, ultra saved between 1. His book reports that several times during the war they undertook detailed investigations to see whether their operations were being compromised by broken Enigma ciphers.

These investigations were spurred because the Germans had broken the British naval code and found the information useful. Their investigations were negative, and the conclusion was that their defeat "was due firstly to outstanding developments in enemy radar Earlier radar was unable to distinguish U-boat conning towers from the surface of the sea, so it could not even locate U-boats attacking convoys on the surface on moonless nights; thus the surfaced U-boats were almost invisible, while having the additional advantage of being swifter than their prey.

The new higher-frequency radar could spot conning towers, and periscopes could even be detected from airplanes. Some idea of the relative effect of cipher-breaking and radar improvement can be obtained from graphs showing the tonnage of merchantmen sunk and the number of U-boats sunk in each month of the Battle of the Atlantic.

Of course, the graphs cannot be interpreted unambiguously, because it is impossible to factor in many variables such as improvements in cipher-breaking and the numerous other advances in equipment and techniques used to combat U-boats. Nonetheless, the data seem to favor the German view—that radar was crucial.

While Ultra certainly affected the course of the Western Front during the war, two factors often argued against Ultra having shortened the overall war by a measure of years are the relatively small role it played in the Eastern Front conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union , and the completely independent development of the U.

Author Jeffrey T. While it is obvious why Britain and the U. During that period, the important contributions to the war effort of a great many people remained unknown, and they were unable to share in the glory of what is now recognised as one of the chief reasons the Allies won the war — or, at least, as quickly as they did. At least three versions exist as to why Ultra was kept secret so long. Each has plausibility, and all may be true. Their traffic was not as secure as they believed, however, which is one reason the British made the machines available.

By the s, newer computer-based ciphers were becoming popular as the world increasingly turned to computerised communications, and the usefulness of Enigma copies and rotor machines generally rapidly decreased. This had prompted the Soviets to change their ciphers, leading to a blackout. The third explanation is given by Winterbotham, who recounts that two weeks after V-E Day , on 25 May , Churchill requested former recipients of Ultra intelligence not to divulge the source or the information that they had received from it, in order that there be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service nor any cause for the Axis to blame Ultra for their defeat.

Since it was British and, later, American message-breaking which had been the most extensive, the importance of Enigma decrypts to the prosecution of the war remained unknown despite revelations by the Poles and the French of their early work on breaking the Enigma cipher.